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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENNER J. CARLING, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and C O N S O L I D A T E D 
WESTERN STEEL D I V I S I O N , 
UNITED STATES STEEL COR-
PORATION, 
Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a proceeding before the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Utah for "acoustic trauma" claimed to have 
been sustained by petitioner as the result of an industrial 
accident in the course of his employment with respondent 
Consolidated Western Steel Division of United States Steel 
Corporation. 
Case No. 
10177 
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DISPOSITION BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The Industrial Commission of Utah found that the 
hearing loss of Petitioner was not caused by a single inci-
dent as claimed by Petitioner and denied workmen's com-
pensation benefits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS PROCEEDING 
Petitioner seeks a determination by this court that the 
order of the Industrial Commission is not lawful. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rule 75 (t) (2) amended November 15, 1955 and Jan-
uary 1, 1962 in sample outline of brief provides under Title 
"Statement of Facts" : 
"The statement should be a concise but com-
plete statement of the material facts. They should 
be stated, not merely as the appellant contends 
them to be, but viewed, as they must on appeal, fav-
orable to the verdict of the jury (or the finding of 
the court)." 
The "Statement of Facts" contained in Petitioner's 
brief does not comply with this general admonition in that 
it recites only "facts" as appellant contends them to be, 
eliminating all reference to relevant controverting evi-
dence. 
For this reason, we deem it necessary to re-state the 
facts as follows: 
1. Petitioner's general employment record. 
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In 1941 Petitioner accepted employment as a welder 
helper with Pacific States Pipe Company at Ironton, Utah. 
He shortly thereafter obtained extensive vocational train-
ing in "pipe fabricating , , and "welding" at Provo, Utah 
(Ex. 11, R. 192). Having thus been trained, he obtained 
employment with Midwest at Geneva, Utah as a pipe fab-
ricator in 1942. This employment continued until he be-
came employed as a "welder" for United States Steel Cor-
poration in the open hearth department at Geneva (Ex. 
11, R. 192). He was employed by numerous contracting 
and industrial firms over the years and at the time of the 
claimed incident, he was employed as a pipefitter perform-
ing steel erection work at Consolidated Western Steel Di-
vision of the United States Steel Corporation at Geneva, 
Utah (R. 3, 21-23). 
2. Type of work actually being performed at the time 
of the claimed incident. 
In the initial claim filed with the Industrial Commis-
sion, Petitioner stated (R. 2) : 
"Using an air chipping gun to vibrate and pack 
sand in pipe (4 inch). Noise from this caused in-
jury." 
The pipe involved was 4 inches in diameter and 21 
feet long (R. 128, 135). The pipes were stood on end 
against a scaffolding and sand poured in from the top to 
facilitate subsequent bending of the pipe. An air hammer 
was operated against each pipe as it was being filled with 
sand to vibrate and compact the sand into the pipe. This 
is a standard method used in the pipe bending process (R. 
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123-143). Photographs demonstrating this process are 
contained in Exhibit 11 at record page 191. Petitioner tes-
tified that he had been operating the air hammer against 
the pipes for from 20 to 25 minutes at the time of the 
claimed incident (R. 147). 
3. Employment of petitioner subsequent to claimed 
injury. 
In the initial claim, Petitioner admits that he was not 
required to leave work because of his claimed injury (R. 
2) . He continued his employment with Consolidated West-
tern Steel Division until July of 1962 (R. 38, 157). He 
then became employed by P. & L. Company as a welder 
and continued in that employment until April of 1963 
when he sustained a back injury which caused his unem-
ployment (R. 38, 158). His employment following the 
claimed industrial accident continued to be "in a noisy 
place" (R. 28). 
4. The claim of Petitioner. 
On June 7, 1962, Petitioner filed with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah his application to Settle Industrial 
Accident Claim (R. 2) . His claim was that on August 31, 
1960, more than twenty-one months prior thereto, he sus-
tained injury arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment. He claims that while he was in the course of oper-
ating the air chipping gun against the pipe, the "general 
noise around the place", including that made by machines 
and trains, became "muffled". He testified that he then 
went straight to and advised his foreman that "I have had 
something happen. I can't hear" (R. 148). He then pro-
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ceeded back to the job and exchanged places with the man 
on the top of the scaffold. Petititoner then poured the 
sand into the pipes and his helper performed the function 
of "beating the pipe" with the air hammer (R. 148). 
Petitioner admitted in his discussions with examining 
physician Voorhees that he had sustained some hearing loss 
prior to 1945-46 and that his mother had had a hearing 
problem (R. 168-9). He did not disclose these facts to his 
own physician, Dr. Gray, at the time of Dr. Gray's exam-
ination although these factors might well have affected his 
diagnosis, particularly in view of the lack of objective 
standards and the fact that the study of hearing loss is 
not "a pure science" (R. 90, 92). 
5. Petitioner's hearing problems. 
The evidence demonstrating that Petitioner has sus-
tained a hearing loss is uncontroverted. His hearing loss 
had commenced many years prior to the claimed industrial 
accident. Exhibit 1 (R. 163) demonstrates that Petitioner 
was found to have a 9% hearing loss on August 29, 1946. 
Exhibit 2 (R. 165) demonstrates that a 6.8% hearing loss 
was noted on January 1, 1947 and that he had been rejected 
by the "Department" on January 7, 1946. Petitioner had 
been advised of his hearing loss in the 1945-46 period. It 
had not been obvious to him and he was "surprised" to 
discover that some loss in fact existed. He ultimately was 
employed despite his hearing loss (R. 168). 
No further audiograms were performed upon Peti-
tioner until shortly after the claimed industrial accident 
(R. 122). An audiogram performed on September 6, 1960 
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demonstrated a 32% hearing loss (R. 20). Numerous other 
audiograms were performed between that date and Octo-
ber 17, 1961 which generally demonstrate that Petitioner's 
hearing gradually deteriorated following the claimed in-
dustrial accident (R. 6-18). 
6. Effect of noise upon hearing. 
Extreme noise can cause hearing loss. The following 
statements appear in Exhibit 9: 
"The effect of noise on hearing is a function of 
both exposure time and noise intensity. As noise 
intensity increases, the amount of daily exposure 
a person can stand without impairing hearing must 
necessarily decrease. 
"The graph on page 162 gives levels in the 8 fre-
quency bands and exposure times which should not 
be exceeded if the average person is not to receive 
some degree of hearing loss from long time ex-
posure, say 25 years, to these noise levels. For noises 
containing discernable discrete frequencies such as 
a generator whine, the noise level values of these 
curves must be reduced by approximately 10 db as 
the ear is more sensitive to single tone noise than 
to broad band noise. 
"To illustrate use of these curves, a person 
could stand on a street corner exposed to 80 db over-
all noise 8 hours a day, 5 days a week for 25 years 
without auditory injury, but might well receive 
some hearing loss from two hours' use of a pneu-
matic riveting gun (where noise levels may reach 
100 db to 110 db in the high frequency octave 
bands) repeated each working day for 25 years." 
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The graph referred to at page 162 demonstrates that 
the safe level is over 100 db for daily 30 minute exposures 
over a 25 year period and that the maximum recommended 
overall noise level for any singe exposure is 140 db (R. 
189). 
Dr. Larsen listed the general threshhold level at 85 
db (R. 117). Dr. Voorhees in his report stated: 
"Much is unknown about any safe amount of 
noise exposure, but in the revised Guide For Con-
servation of Hearing in Noise published by the 
American Academy of Opthamology and Otolar-
yngology in 1957, it is stated, 'if the sound energy 
of the noise is distributed more or less evenly 
through the eight octave bands and if a person is 
to be exposed to this noise regularly for many hours 
a day, five days a week for many years, then; if 
the noise level in either the 300-600 cycle band or 
the 600-1200 band at 85 db, the initiation of noise 
exposure control and tests of hearing is advisable/ " 
Dr. Gray, testifying for the Petitioner, admitted that 
hearing loss due to noise usually resulted from "a more 
prolonged exposure" (R. 70). He testified further that 
traumatic sound in industry "is stated to be over 100 deci-
bels, and frequently in the range of 125 decibels of sound 
pressure" (R. 96). 
7. Noise level and duration at the time of the claimed 
industrial accident 
Petitioner testified that he operated an air gun against 
the pipes involved only after they had become filled with 
sand. He testified that he had been engaged in this ac-
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tivity for only from 20 to 25 minutes at the time of the 
claimed incident (R. 145, 147). When being interviewed 
by Dr. Voorhees, he stated that he had been hammering 
for from 15 to 20 minutes prior to the claimed incident (R. 
167). He did not offer any evidence of any sudden or ex-
treme noise. 
Prior to the time of the hearing, the employer re-
tained Leland K. Irvine, an admitted expert specializing 
in accoustical engineering, to recreate to the extent possi-
ble the precise circumstances involved at the time of the 
alleged incident and to determine noise intensity (R. 122-
3). The same type pipe was used and filled with sand in 
a similar manner. A similar air gun then was used to 
vibrate the sand in the pipes. Tests were taken to indicate 
noise levels when the pipes were empty, when they were 
1/3 full, when they were 1/2 full and when they were com-
pletely filled (R. 125, 126, 135). Since Petitioner admit-
tedly operated the air hammer against the pipe only when 
full, those particular readings more nearly approximate 
the actual condition existing at the time of the alleged 
incident (R. 145). 
The sound pressure level measurements indicated 
sounds well distributed in eight octave bands ranging from 
20-75 to 4800-9600 frequency cycles per second. When the 
pipe was full of sand, the situation which existed when 
Petitioner was vibrating the pipe, all of the octave bands 
were below 90 and all but two of the octave bands were 80 
or below. The tests indicated that, even with the pipe 
empty, a condition not experienced by Petitioner, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sound did not reach 110 db in any frequency cycle or oc-
tave band (R. 162). As is indicated above, these levels are 
below tolerance levels for brief exposures of 15 to 25 min-
utes duration. For example, Dr. Gray, Petitioner's own 
witness, listed tolerance levels at "over 100 decibels and 
frequently in the range of 125 decibels" (R. 96). 
In interpreting Mr. Irvine's report, Dr. Voorhees noted 
that "it appears that the noise distribution by the type of 
action in which Mr. Carling was engaged was quite diffuse 
throughout the octave bands" (R. 169). As is noted above, 
tolerance levels are higher under these conditions than 
where fewer octave bands are present (R. 190). 
8. The medical evidence. 
At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated 
that all medical reports would be received in evidence and 
that either party would have the right, even if another 
hearing was required, to cross examine any doctor render-
ing such reports (R. 55). However, neither party elected 
to call doctors who filed medical reports for cross examina-
tion pursuant to such stipulation. 
A. Dr. Dean W. Gray. 
Dr. Gray filed a medical report in which he noted that 
there was no history of hearing loss prior to the alleged 
injury (R. 188). Much of his testimony at the hearing is 
quoted in Appellant's Brief. Despite this long quotation, 
the most critical testimony was omitted; i.e. that testimony 
most favorable to the finding of the commission below. 
Although Dr. Gray initially testified that in his opinion 
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Petitioner's loss of hearing was due to acoustic trauma, 
he admitted on cross examination that Petitioner's condi-
tion may be a "chronic progressive hearing loss, referred 
to frequently as presbycusis" (R. 70), that his "first and 
initial thought" was that any "acoustic trauma" resulted 
from a "long exposure" (R. 71), that Petioner's condition 
may have resulted from a "hereditary nerve loss" (R. 91), 
and that his ultimate diagnosis was based in "substantial 
part" upon Petitioner's own statements (R. 85). 
B. Dr. Boyd J. Larsen: 
Dr. Cornell, a physician working under the direction 
of Dr. Larsen, the staff physician for the employer, could 
find no physical evidence of injury, aside from Petitioner's 
subjective symptoms. He, therefore, advised Petitioner that 
his condition was non-industrial and that he should em-
ploy his own physician (R. 4) . Dr. Ostler was suggested 
to him (R. 107). His referral to Dr. Ostler was as a non-
industrial patient (R. 107). Dr. Larsen expressed his 
opinion as follows (R. 114-115) : 
"Q. Well, are you able to state that it could 
not have been caused by the exposure to the noise 
of the hammer, if Mr. Carling in fact was exposed 
to such noise? 
"A. I could express an opinion to this effect. 
That there was one incident in which he was using 
the air hammer for a relatively short period of 
time, and I would not feel that this one incident has 
caused his hearing condition as it is today. 
"Q. And was this your opinion when he first 
visited you? 
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"A. Yes. For this reason he was advised to 
seek his own medical care, because of previous hear-
ing loss that our records indicated that he had." 
Dr. Larsen also testified that there had been a "de-
terioration of his hearing" following the claimed incident 
(R. 119). 
C. Dr. D.E. Ostler: 
Dr. Ostler, the private physician to whom Petitioner 
was referred as a non-industrial patient, stated in his 
report (R. 5 ) : 
"His loss, as you will note, has been mainly on 
the high tones, in other words, it is a nerve deaf-
ness, which could have come from exposure to loud 
noises, some toxic condition, or could be hereditary. 
"My oipinion is that it is probably the result 
of prolonged exposure to loud noises." 
D. Report of medical panel comprised of R. 
Mowatt Muirhead, Dr. James Cleary and Dr. 
Bryce Fairbanks: 
The report of the panel was filed on December 5, 1962 
(R. 28). Objection thereto was duly filed by Petitioner. 
The panel found (R. 28) : 
"Patient states that in 1952 he had a hearing 
test given at Geneva Steel, pre-employment, at 
which time he was told that he had a high tone loss 
but was employable. This might account for a pre-
liminary loss of five to ten per cent. The panel 
feels that his employment in the noisy place would 
contribute to hearing loss that is on a progressive 
basis, and following this injury in August, 1960, the 
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hearing did not return to a serviceable level. The 
panel feels that the hearing loss noted by Dr. Ostler 
in October, 1960, could be considered to be the loss 
that this person has suffered, namely 35.4%. 
"The patient has continued to work in a noisy 
place and it is noted that his hearing has continued 
to fall over the year in which Dr. Ostler saw this 
patient, and a hearing examination done in this 
office showed a further loss to about 51% as of 
October, 1962." 
The same medical panel made a supplemental report 
under date of August 17, 1963 (R. 194) to which Petitioner 
did not object. 
E. Report of Dr. Richard L. Voorhees: 
In his report, Dr. Voorhees stated in part (R. 167-9) : 
"I am again impressed by the marked progres-
sion of the hearing loss in both ears. This is an 
interesting point, since usually hearing losses caused 
by loud noise are what is characteristically defined 
as acoustic trauma, happens suddenly and does not 
become worse thereafter. However, this man has 
shown progressive hearing loss since the date of the 
first audiogram following his supposed burst of 
loud noise exposure. 
"I am sure that there is no way to definitely 
determine the entire etiology of this man's condi-
tion, but I can't help feeling that there is something 
else behind the progression of his hearing loss. One 
must consider that this man's mother had hearing 
loss and there may be some congenital element to 
his problem. In addition to this, he has undoubtedly 
some element of presbycusis. This is usually slow 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
in its progression, but I suppose it could be said 
that it is operating here. 
<t* * * 
"A few further thoughts on the probable na-
ture of this hearing loss; ordinarily with noise in-
duced hearing loss the high frequencies go first. 
This is commonly known. However, to produce loss 
in the lower frequencies as demonstrated by Mr. 
Carling, it is usually necessary to be in a continu-
ous loud noise atmosphere of somewhat consider-
able intensity for a longer period of time." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRAR-
ILY, CAPRICIOUSLY OR UNREASONABLY 
IN DENYING WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS TO PETITIONER FOR AN AL-
LEGED INDUSTRIAL INJURY ON AUGUST 
31, 1960. 
The scope of review in a case such as this where a 
claimant appeals from a finding of the Industrial Commis-
sion is well settled. The judicial power on review in such 
cases was articulated by Justice Wolfe in the case of Wood-
burn V. Industrial Commission, 111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d 
209 (1947) : 
"The extent of review by this court in this 
type of case is: Did the Commission act without 
or in excess of its powers in denying compensation 
to the plaintiff? Section 42-1-78, U. C. A. 1943. 
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"The test applicable to this type of case to de-
termine whether or not the commission acted with-
out or in excess of its powers has been clearly crys-
talized by previous opinion and was stated as fol-
lows in Kent V. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 
381, 57 P. 2d 724, 725: I n the case of denial of 
compensation, the record must disclose that there 
is material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted 
evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify 
the conclusion as a matter of law, that the Indus-
trial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously dis-
regarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to 
believe such evidence/ In Lorange V. Industrial 
Commission, 107 Utah 261, 153 P. 2d 272, 273, we 
quoted with approval from Kavalinakis V. Indus-
trial Commission, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 698, as fol-
lows: 'Unless therefore it can be said, upon the 
whole record, that the Commission clearly acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings 
and decisions, this court is powerless to interfere. 
•• * * * It was not intended, * * * that this 
court, in matters of evidence, should to any extent 
substitute its judgment for the judgment of the 
Commission/ " 
In his brief, Petitioner contends that the uncontra-
dicted evidence supports the proposition that the claimant 
suffered an accidental injury while using an air gun in 
the course of his employment resulting in a permanent par-
tial hearing disability, citing very selective portions of the 
record. To support this argument, Petitioner claims in his 
brief that the only evidence on this matter is the testimony 
of the Petitioner and Dr. Gray, his physician. This con-
tention is wholly without support in the record. However, 
even assuming arguendo that their testimony does make 
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this point, there is considerable competent contradictory 
evidence. The following evidence, including medical reports 
which were admitted into evidence by the stipulation of 
the parties, (R. 55) is illustrative: 
A. As is demonstrated in this brief in the Statement 
of Facts under heading "Noise Level and Duration at Time 
of Claimed Industrial Accident", Petitioner testified that 
he operated the air gun against the pipes only after they 
had become filled with sand. The noise intensity generated 
by this conduct was determined by an acoustical engineer 
who recreated, to the extent possible, these precise condi-
tions. The test performed by the acoustical engineer dem-
onstrated that the sound vibrations were fairly well dis-
tributed over all 8 octave bands and that noise intensity 
was well below 80 decibels in 6 of the octave bands and 
below 90 decibels in the other two. 
As is pointed out in the Statement of Facts in this 
brief under heading "Effect of Noise Upon Hearing", such 
decibel levels are well below threshhold tolerance levels for 
brief exposure. Dr. Gray, Petitioner's own expert witness, 
listed tolerance levels for traumatic sound in industry as 
"over 100 decibels, and in the frequency range of 125 deci-
bels of sound pressure". Such evidence demonstrates that 
as a physical and a medical proposition, it is extremely 
unlikely, if not wholly impossible, that the use of the air 
hammer against the pipes when full of sand caused the 
acoustic trauma claimed by Petitioner. 
B. Dr. Boyd J. Larsen, employer's physician, testi-
fied that there was no physicial evidence of injury, aside 
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from Petitioner's subjective symptoms (R. 4) . Dr. Larsen 
also testified that Petitioner had suffered a prior hearing 
loss, that the deterioration of his hearing continued after 
the claimed incident and that in his opinion the use of the 
air hammer for a relatively short period of time did not 
cause the acoustic trauma claimed (R. 114-15, 119). 
C. Dr. D. E. Ostler, a private physician who treated 
Petitioner as a non-industrial patient, stated in his report 
that in his opinion Petitioner's condition "is probably the 
result of prolonged exposure to loud noises" (R. 5) . 
D. The medical panel, R. Mowatt Muirhead, James 
Cleary and Bryce Fairbanks, reported a prior hearing loss 
and a continuation of hearing degeneration after the 
claimed incident. In the opinion of the panel, "employment 
in the noisy place would contribute to hearing loss that is 
on a progressive basis" (R. 28). 
E. In medical report, Dr. Richard L. Voorhees 
stressed the "marked progression of hearing loss in both 
ears", noted that Petitioner's "mother had a hearing loss 
and there may be some congenital element to his problem", 
that Petitioner "has undoubtedly some element of presby-
cusis * * * and that it is operating here" and that 
hearing loss of the kind demonstrated by Petitioner usually 
results from "a continuous loud noise atmosphere of some-
what considerable intensity for a long period of time" 
(R. 194). 
In addition to this contradictory evidence, there is con-
siderable doubt as to the credibility of Petitioner's medical 
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testimony as presented by Dr. Gray. It is true that Dr. 
Gray initially testified that Petitioner's condition resulted 
from "acoustic trauma" (R. 71). However, the following 
admissions made by Dr. Gray robbed his opinion of much 
of its credence: 
1) Petitioner's condition could be the result of either 
a "chronic progressive hearing loss, referred to frequently 
as prebycusis", or to an acoustic trauma. His opinion that 
the condition resulted from acoustic trauma, rather than 
presbycusis, was based upon Petitioner's personal history 
as related to him by Petitioner (R. 70). 
2) Dr. Gray's "first and initial thought" was that 
any acoustic trauma resulted from a "long exposure". He 
later changed that opinion because of the statements made 
to him by Petitioner (R. 71). 
3) Acoustic trauma usually occurs from prolonged 
exposure (R. 70-1,93). 
4) The determination of the cause of hearing loss 
is not a "pure science". Petitioner's condition may have 
resulted from a hereditary progressive condition. Dr. 
Gray's diagnosis was based in "substantial part" upon 
Petitioner's statements to him (R. 85, 91, 92). 
5) Noise which causes trauma in industry is usually 
over 100 decibels and frequently in the range of 125 deci-
bels (R. 96). (Note that the noise generated by operating 
an air hammer against a full pipe is substantially below 
those levels.) (R. 162). 
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6) Petitioner had admitted to him that he had been 
employed in the past "around loud noise" (R. 93). 
7) If Petitioner had had a prior hearing loss and 
if his mother had suffered a hearing loss, "this would in-
troduce this possibility of having inherited a propensity 
or a hereditary progressive hearing loss" (R. 90) and Peti-
tioner's condition may have been due to a "hereditary 
nerve loss" (R. 91). 
Thus it is seen that once Dr. Gray was presented with 
the actual facts, rather than those which claimant had al-
leged to be true, his opinion wavered. He admittedly re-
lied in "substantial part" upon the history given to him by 
claimant, (R. 85) which was critical in his diagnosis since 
it alone led to the conclusion that there had been an abrupt 
hearing loss on the date of the alleged incident. 
It is respectfully submitted that inasmuch as Dr. 
Gray's diagnosis is based in "substantial part" on the self 
serving statements of the claimant who has a pecuniary 
interest in the outcome of this case, the Commission was 
justified in disregarding portions of Dr. Gray's testimony. 
It has long been the rule in this state that the Commission 
may refuse to believe evidence when it derives solely from 
an interested witness. Smith v. Industrial Commission, 104 
Utah 318, 140 P. 2d 314 (1943). Afortiori, the Commission 
would be justified in disbelieving Petitioner's testimony, 
and that of his doctor derived in substantial part from 
claimant's statements when, in addition, such testimony is 
contradicted and controverted by other competent and au-
thoritative evidence. 
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Not only is the testimony of Dr. Gray put in question 
by virtue of his reliance upon statements of claimant, but 
similarly the statements of the claimant himself are sub-
ject to serious questions of credibility. The trier of fact 
has the prerogative of judging credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight to be given the evidence. Page V. Federal 
Security Insurance Company, 8 U. 2d 226, 332 P. 2d 666 
(1958). In the case at bar the Commission has exercised 
that prerogative properly since the claimant's testimony 
may well be jaundiced by bias, prejudice and self-interest 
and since, contrary to the allegations of Petitioner in his 
brief, there is substantial, competent contradictory evi-
dence. 
The Commission might properly have questioned the 
claimant's credibility in light of the fact that claimant mis-
stated his health history to Dr. Gray. When Dr. Gray asked 
him if he had had previous hearing loss, he replied that 
he had not (R. 84). This statement proved to be contrary 
to the truth and is thus an indication of the veracity of the 
claimant's other statements. (See Exhibits 1 and 2, R. 163-
4, indicating prior hearing loss and Petitioner's admission 
to Dr. Voorhees that he was aware of the prior hearing 
lossR. 168). 
Even assuming for purposes of argument that Peti-
tioner was conscious of a marked change in his hearing on 
the day in question, this fact, standing alone, certainly 
would not have supported a finding by the Commission of 
the occurrence of an industrial accident. We have searched 
the record in vain for any evidence that the decibel level 
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of the noise at the time of the claimed hearing loss was of 
sufficient intensity and duration to have caused traumatic 
injury. Construing the evidence most favorably to Peti-
tioner, at best, there would be a showing only that a hear-
ing loss occurred on the job without any evidence whatso-
ever that noise, or any other employment related factor, 
caused such loss. This complete failure of proof upon the 
necessary element of causation apparently prompted the 
following comment by the referee during the course of the 
hearing (R. 114) : 
"I might point out, gentlemen, that the Com-
mission still has to determine — before we pay any 
attention to any of this testimony — whether there 
actually was excessive exposure to noise. We 
haven't determined that yet. The panel has no au-
thority to make that kind of a decision. That is 
for the Commission, so the panel report always 
assumes, but not decides." 
No evidence of "excessive exposure to noise" was pre-
sented at the hearing. The only evidence on this subject 
indicated affirmatively that there was no "excessive ex-
posure to noise". Under these circumstances, and since 
Petitioner makes no claim of occupational disease (R. 2, 
59). Petitioner failed to meet the following test re-
cently enunciated by this court in Pintar v. The Industrial 
Commission of the State of Utah, et al, 14 Utah 2d 276, 
382 P. 2d 414 (1963): 
"It is therefore a prerequisite to compensation 
that his disability be shown to result not as a grad-
ual development because of the nature or conditions 
of his work, but from an identifiable accident or 
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accidents in the course of his employment. There 
being substantial evidence to support the Commis-
sion's finding to the contrary, no basis exists upon 
which this court could rule that its denial of com-
pensation was capricious or arbitrary." 
In Purity Biscuit Company V. Industrial Commission, 
115 Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 961 (1949), relied upon by Petitioner 
in his Petition for Rehearing (R. 207) and in his brief 
(brief 25) this court in opinion by Justice Wade quoted 
with approval the following language of Mr. Chief Justice 
Wolfe in Dee Memorial Hospital Association v. Industrial 
Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P. 2d 233 (1943) : 
«* * * j conclude that it is necessary that 
the claimant establish some connection between the 
injury and the employment before compensation 
will be allowed. The mere fact that the employee be-
comes ill on the premises of the employer will not 
suffice. The employer should not be charged with 
internal failures not contributed to nor caused by 
the employment nor occurring in pursuit thereof 
nor in any way employment-connected. * * *" 
In Tedesco V. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 501, 46 
P. 2d 670 (1935), a decedent suffered "peritonitis" due to 
a perforated ulcer. He was a strong, healthy athletic man, 
34 years old, had had no physical disability and had mani-
fest no distress after eating nor complained of stomach 
trouble. While working in a powder magazine, he attempted 
to lift a 50 pound case of powder which had been stuck to 
the floor. In jerking it loose, he was stricken by a severe 
pain in the abdomen. He reported this experience to fellow 
employees and obtained medical treatment, but died some 
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time later. In sustaining a denial of workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, this court stated: 
"For applicant to establish a case it was neces-
sary to show a causal connection between the al-
leged accident and the resulting injury, if any, and 
the duodenal ulcer, its perforation of the bowel, 
and the resulting peritonitis. The record fails to 
disclose any causal connection between the alleged 
accidental injury and the peritonitis causing death. 
To certain hypothetical questions, assuming some 
matters not in evidence, whereby it was attempted 
to show that there was a connection between a 
strangulated hernia and the perforated duodenal 
ulcer, the answer was that 'it was possible', while 
it was also stated that no such connection was found 
to exist. There is no direct evidence in the record 
that the alleged injury caused a hernia. There is no 
evidence in the record, if it be inferred that such 
hernia existed, that there was any connection be-
tween such hernia and the duodenal ulcer, its per-
foration of the duodenum, or the death of deceased. 
"The ultimate and controlling findings of the 
Commission are in harmony with the competent 
evidence submitted. No cause for disturbing the 
findings of the Commission is shown. The order 
denying compensation is therefore affirmed." 
Similarly, here the record fails to disclose any causal 
connection between the alleged accidental injury and the 
hearing loss sustained. On the contrary, the competent evi-
dence set forth above demonstrates affirmatively that no 
causal connection existed. 
The record in this case may be summarized briefly as 
follows: 
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A. The evidence as to whdther or not Petitioner sus-
tained an abrupt hearing loss i^  in conflict. The only evi-
dence indicating an abrupt heaifing loss was derived from 
the person with a pecuniary interest in the case. 
B. The evidence relating tp the cause of the hearing 
loss is in conflict. 
C. The record contains nb evidence whatsoever of 
any "excessive exposure to noiie". On the contrary, the 
evidence on this subject demonstrates that the noise level 
was well under limits of safety. 
We submit that the record clearly demonstrates the 
propriety of the order of the Commission denying benefits 
to Petitioner, that in so doing, the Commission did not act 
arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably and that its order 
should be affirmed by this court. 
POINT 
THE COMMISSION DID rtOT ERR BY "PRE-
VENTING OR DISSUADING" PETITIONER 
FROM INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL EVI-
DENCE. 
In Point II of Petitioner's irief (brief pages 21, 22) 
he suggests that Petitioner was dissuaded at the hearing 
from producing supplemental evidence corroborating Peti-
tioner's testimony that he observed a difference in his hear-
ing immediately following the claimed industrial accident. 
Petitioner cites record pages 71 pud 72 in support of this 
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claim. We fail to find anything at those pages of the tran-
script, or at any other place, supporting this claim. Peti-
tioner may have had reference to the colloquy between the 
referee and counsel for Petitioner relating to the sound 
studies made by the acoustical engineer at record pages 
119, 120, 121, 122 and 131. The record there demonstrates 
that counsel for Petitioner was objecting to introduction 
into evidence of the sound studies performed by the acous-
tical engineer. Counsel for Petitioner offered to call addi-
tional witnesses to demonstrate the marked change in hear-
ing of the claimant. After some discussion, the referee 
concluded, "I don't think I need anything like that" (R. 
121). Counsel for Petitioner then responded "All right. 
I'll accept the Commissioner's statement" (R. 121). The 
colloquy with respect to the same evidence was resumed 
at record page 131. There counsel for Petitioner renewed 
his objections stating: "I am trying to — of course they 
have got tests here, which I think are completely unrelia-
ble. It is my duty to —." 
The referee responded: "Then you can put on your 
witnesses" (R. 131). 
The general rule applicable where a claim is made on 
appeal that the trier of the facts erroneously excluded evi-
dence is stated in 4A C. J. S., Appeal and Error, Section 
712 at page 551 as follows: 
"To present an alleged error in the exclusion of 
evidence, the record must show that it was offered 
and excluded, the purpose for which it was offered, 
that it was material and relevant, the ground urged 
against its admission in the absence of a showing 
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that only a general objection was made, the grounds 
of objection to its exclusion, and the grounds on 
which it was excluded;" 
We submit that none of these tests are satisfied. Peti-
tioner offered no evidence, despite the fact that he was 
invited to do so by the Commission (R. 131). No evidence 
was excluded by the Commission. No objection was made 
by Petitioner to any exclusion which he assumed. On the 
contrary, Petitioner acquiesced in any assumed exclusion 
of evidence by saying "All right. I'll accept the Commis-
sioner's statement" (R. 121) and by failing to accept the 
invitation of the referee to "put on witnesses" (R. 131). 
In addition, even assuming arguendo that the Com-
mission had excluded additional evidence duly and properly 
offered which would corroborate Petitioner's claim of sud-
den hearing loss, such exclusion would not be prejudicial 
upon the record of this case. The basis for the decision 
below was that Petitioner had failed to prove that an in-
cident during his employment had caused his hearing loss 
(R. 200-201). Thus, the basic deficiency in Petitioner's 
case was his failure to show a causal relationship between 
the incident claimed to have occurred and the hearing loss 
which developed. As perceived by the Commission, such a 
causal relationship is a vital prerequisite to recover under 
the Workmen's Compensation laws of the State of Utah. 
See Purity Biscuit Company v. Industrial Commission, 115 
Utah 1, 201 P. 2d 961 (1949); Tedesco V. Industrial Com-
mission, 86 Utah 501, 46 P. 2d 670 (1935). 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission did 
IMV( in any way prevent or dissuade the Petitioner from 
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introducing evidence, but, as found by the Commission (R. 
200) that ''there is no competent evidence in the record to 
support the single incident as the cause of hearing loss", 
and that the order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
EVEN THOUGH A HEARING DISABILITY 
MIGHT BE A COMPENSABLE TYPE OF AC-
CIDENTAL INJURY PURSUANT TO TITLE 
35, CHAPTER 1 OF UTAH CODE ANNO-
TATED, 1953, AS AMENDED, THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE DO NOT ESTABLISH AN ACCI-
DENTAL INJURY. 
The Industrial Commission found that "There is no 
competent evidence in the record to support the single in-
cident as the cause of hearing loss" (R. 200). 
The statute provides that "* * * The findings 
and conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact 
shall be conclusive and final and shall not be subject to 
review; * * *." 35-1-85 U. C. A. 1953. 
This court has on numerous occasions interpreted this 
statute and held that if there is competent evidence of sub-
stantial character to sustain the findings of the Commis-
sion, they will not be disturbed. One of the more recent 
decisions of the court so holding is that of Edlund V. In-
dustrial Commission, 122 Utah 238, 248 P. 2d 365 (1952). 
We have heretofore set forth herein the evidence upon 
which the above finding was made and respectfully submit 
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that it is competent and of substantial character and that 
the finding should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the evidence in the record relating to 
an industrial accident is in substantial controversy, that 
the record contains no evidence whatsoever of any causal 
connection between the Petitioner's hearing loss and any 
phase of his employment with Respondent, that the order 
of the Commission denying workmen's compensation bene-
fits to the Petitioner is not arbitrary, capricious or unrea-
sonable and that it should be affirmed by this court. 
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